Abstract-This paper studies the problem of secure transmission in dual-hop cooperative networks with untrusted relays, where each relay acts as both a potential helper and an eavesdropper. A security-aware relaying scheme is proposed, which employs the alternate jamming and secrecy-enhanced relay selection to prevent the confidential message from being eavesdropped by the untrusted relays. To evaluate the performance of the proposed strategies, we derive the lower bound of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate (ESR), and conduct the asymptotic analysis to examine how the ESR scales as the number of relays increases.
relay systems. In [8] , the secrecy outage probabilities of several relaying schemes were analyzed. In [9] , the power allocation policy was developed for amplify-and-forward (AF) untrusted relay systems.
Although diverse results on untrusted relay systems have been reported, the majority of existing works deal with the simple model with only one relay node. For multi-relay networks, [10] analyzed the relationship between the system secrecy capacity and the number of untrusted relays. Reference [11] proposed to use relay assignment and link adaptation to realize both secure and spectral-efficient communications. However, [10] and [11] only considered the information leakage problem during the first phase of any two-hop transmission. This simplifies the protocol design, but may not hold in practice.
Unlike [10] and [11] , we in this paper try to secure the transmissions of both the first and the second phases, and our contributions are threefold: First, an alternate jamming method is introduced to prevent information leakage. Second, both optimal and sub-optimal secrecy-enhanced relay selection policies are proposed. Third, the lower bound of the achievable ergodic secrecy rate (ESR) is derived, and the asymptotic analysis of the ESR is given as well.
II. SYSTEM MODEL We consider a dual-hop AF network consisting of a source (S), a destination (D) and K untrusted relays (R k , k = 1, . . . , K). The direct link between S and D does not exist. Each node is employed with a single antenna and operates in a halfduplex mode. S transmits its signals frame by frame, and the transmission of each frame is composed of two phases, namely the broadcast phase (1st phase) and the relaying phase (2nd phase). The channel between any node pair (i, j), denoted by h i j , is modeled by a complex Gaussian variable with mean zero and variance µ i j . All channel coefficients remain constant within one frame and vary independently from frame to frame. The channels are assumed to be reciprocal, i.e., h i j = h ji . The total transmit power of each phase is constrained by P, and the additive noise at each receiver is characterized by a zeromean, complex Gaussian variable with variance N 0 . We denote the average signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) per phase by ρ = P/N 0 .
For the considered channel model, γ i j Δ = ρ|h i j | 2 follows an exponential distribution with the rate parameter λ i j = (ρµ i j ) −1 . Throughout this paper, log(·) denotes the base-2 logarithm, E[·] represents the expectation operator, and [x] + = max{0, x}.
To prevent the source message from being eavesdropped at the untrusted relays, we propose to use an alternate jamming method, whose details are given as follows.
During the 1st phase, S transmits x S with power αP and D sends the artificial noise n D with power (1 − α)P, where α ∈ (0, 1) represents the power allocation factor. Thus, the received signal at any relay R l during this phase is given by Throughout this paper, w (n) m is the additive noise at node m(m ∈ {R l , D}) within the n th phase (n ∈ {1, 2}).
During the 2nd phase, a single selected relay R k normalizes its received signal y (1) k and forwards it with power βP(0 < β < 1). Note that all the non-selected relays can hear from R k and act only as eavesdroppers. Therefore, we let S transmit the artificial noise n S , with power (1 − β)P, to jam these relays. Thus, at the end of the 2nd phase, the received signals at D and R l (l = 1, . . . , K, l = k) can be expressed respectively as
and y
where
Since n D is the transmitted signal from the destination during the previous phase, D can subtract the term
and then decode the source information based on the remainder. Consequently, the achievable rate at the destination can be calculated by
Due to the half-duplex constraint, the selected relay R k receives the source signal in the broadcast phase only, and thus its achievable rate is given by
The non-selected relays R l 's (l = k), on the other hand, can receive signals during both the 1st and 2nd phases, and combine y to extract the source information. For simplicity, we assume selection combining (SC) is adopted at these relay nodes. After some derivations, we can express the achievable rate at any non-selected relay R l by
where γ
For untrusted relay systems, any relay node acts as an eavesdropper, no matter whether it is the selected helper or not. According to [1, eq. (11) ], the secrecy rate of the system, with R k being the selected relay, can be calculated as
where γ E = max γ
l }} .
III. SECRECY-ENHANCED RELAY SELECTION

A. Optimal Selection Scheme
The secrecy-enhanced relay selection aims at maximizing the secrecy rate given by (7) . To achieve this goal, the selected relay needs to satisfy
It can be seen from (4)- (7) that, to select the optimal relay, the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of all relaying links as well as that of all inter-relay links have to be acquired. Therefore, it is rather difficult to realize the optimal relay selection in practical systems, especially when the number of relays is large. This motivates us to design the sub-optimal relay selection strategy with a lower complexity.
B. Suboptimal Selection Scheme
The suboptimal relay selection scheme can be developed by examining the lower bound of the secrecy rate expression. To fulfil this, we first derive the lower bound of γ D as follows:
where (a) is obtained by using [12, eq. (21)].
On the other hand, γ E can be re-written as
Since γ
γ E can be further simplified as
By substituting (9) and (12) into (7), we can obtain the lower bound of the instantaneous secrecy rate under the assumption that R k is the selected relay. Now, instead of maximizing the secrecy rate in (7), we try to maximize this lower bound, and develop the sub-optimal relay selection strategy as
The proposed scheme in (13) only requires the instantaneous CSIs of the source-relay and relay-destination links, and does not depend on the availability of the inter-relay channel coefficients. Thus, it can be realized in a distributed manner [3] , which enjoys a low complexity.
IV. ERGODIC SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, the lower bound of the ESR achieved by the proposed sub-optimal strategy is derived. For mathematical convenience, we assume all λ sk 's are identical and denote them by λ sr . The same assumption holds as well for all λ kd 's, i.e., λ kd = λ rd for all k's. By plugging (9) and (12) into (7) and letting k = k * , we can lower bound the ESR by (14) , which is shown at the bottom of the next page.
For the considered channel model, αγ sk and (1 + β − α)γ kd are exponentially distributed with rate parameters λ sr α and λ rd (1+β−α) , respectively. Let Z = min(αγ sk * , (1 + β − α)γ k * d ). According to the probability density function (PDF) of exponential variables and order statistics, the PDF of Z can be expressed as f Z (z) = Kλe −λz (1 − e −λz ) K−1 , where λ = λ sr α + λ rd (1+β−α) . Therefore, after some mathematical manipulations, we have 
. By resorting to the order statistics, we can obtain the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of γ E as
Using the above CDF expression and doing some tedious derivations, we have
where 
where (18) into (14), we can obtain the closed-form expression for the ESR lower bound. However, we omit its explicit expression due to page limit. The tightness of this bound will be verified via simulations in Section VI.
V. ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS OF ERGODIC SECRECY RATE
Now we focus on the large-K case and study how the ESR scales as the number of relays increases. Here, the extremevalue theory (EVT) will be used to facilitate the analysis. The main results of EVT can be found in [14, Sec. III].
The lower bound of ESR is shown in (14) . To perform the asymptotic analysis, we define γ
.
It can be easily verified that γ (k)
D belongs to Type I domain of attraction (See [14] for its definition.). Consequently, max
where µ is a Gumbel-distributed random variable [14] , and a D K and b D K are respectively given by
and
Based on Lemma in [14] , there exist sequences of constants
Following similar steps we can derive that, as K tends to infinity, log(1 + max 1≤l≤K 
respectively. In (22), W (x) is the Lambert-W function. By combining the above results with (14) and performing the statistical average, we have (for large K)
where κ ≈ 0.577 is the Euler constant. It is not hard to verify that, as
Therefore, the asymptotic expression for the lower bound of the ESR can be further approximated as
By plugging (20) and (22) into (24) and exploiting the fact W (x) ≈ ln x − ln ln x for large x, we can re-write (24) as
(25) It can be proven that the right-hand side of (25) is a decreasing function of K. This implies that, although the untrusted relays can assist the S → D transmission, the achievable ESR will degrade when deploying more relays.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, simulations are carried out to validate the proposed schemes. For simplicity, we set α = β = 0.5. In the following figures, the notation "SNR" represents the ratio of P to N 0 , i.e., ρ in Section II. Fig. 1 exhibits the ESR performances for the proposed optimal and suboptimal relay selection schemes, where two combining methods (i.e., MRC and SC) are assumed to be adopted at the relay nodes. The ESR of the AF system with trusted relays, which is the Shannon capacity of the system, is provided to show the performance loss incurred by the untrustworthy behaviors of the relays. In addition, we compare the ESR achieved by our design with that of the selection policy in [5, eq. (10) ]. It is observed from Fig. 1 that, the proposed sub-optimal relay selection scheme can achieve near-optimal performance, and the ESR differences between the sub-optimal and the optimal schemes are negligible. When MRC is adopted, the proposed policy in (13) works as well, and its achieved ESR performance is also very satisfactory. Further, the derived lower bound is tight for medium to high SNRs, verifying our theoretical analysis. A final observation is that, our scheme can yield a significant performance gain compared to the existing counterpart in [5] .
The achievable ESR versus the number of relays (K) for the suboptimal relay selection scheme is depicted in Fig. 2 , where the results in (14) and (25) are also plotted. Fig. 2 shows that, the ESR decreases as K increases, which is in accordance with the analysis in Section V. An intuitive explanation to this phenomenon is that, although the existence of more relays provides a higher probability to select a better helper, it also increases the amount of information leakage, where the latter is the dominant factor.
